1.	**22PR0309**	**WEBSTER v. WEBSTER**
OSC		

TENTATIVE RULING #1:

APPEARANCES REQUIRED ON FRIDAY, OCTOBER 18, 2024, AT 8:30 AM IN DEPARTMENT NINE.

IF A PARTY OR PARTIES WISH TO APPEAR BY ZOOM, PLEASE CONTACT THE COURT AT (530) 621-5867 AND MEETING INFORMATION WILL BE PROVIDED.

2.	**22CV1334**	**BLY-CHESTER v. EL DORADO COUNTY BOARD OF SUP.**
Motion for Attorney's Fees		

Per stipulation of the parties and approval of the court on October 16, 2024, this matter was continued. Matter is dropped from calendar.

TENTATIVE RULING #2:

MATTER DROPPED FROM CALENDAR.

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3.	**24CV0949**	**PINO GRANDE LLC, ET AL v. WADSWORTH, ET AL**
Motion to File First Amended		

Plaintiffs Pino Grande LLC and Jeffrey Bruce Wadsworth (collectively "Plaintiffs") bring this Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint ("Motion"). Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Defendants on May 8, 2024, alleging only one cause of action – partition by private sale. Defendants filed a general denial on June 7, 2024, and an Amended Answer on July 10, 2024.

Plaintiffs own a timber and forestry management businesses and have business operations centered on property located in El Dorado County (hereinafter the "Subject Property"). The Subject Property is mutually owned by all Parties to this action. The Subject Property is zoned for agricultural use, and per Resolution No. 94-69 of the Board of Supervisors, the property shall not be used for any purpose other than the production of agricultural products including timber. (Ex. 2)

"The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on such terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading …. The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon such terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars…." (Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. §473.) Further, if the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend. (*Nelson v. Superior Court* (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 78, 79-80; *Estate of Herbst* (1938) 26 Cal.App.2d 251-252; *Norton v. Bassett* (1910) 158 Cal. 425, 427.

There is an extensive factual background, as laid out in the Motion. Plaintiffs propose to amend their Complaint to remove the sole cause of action brought in the Complaint, and to instead bring causes of action for: (1) private nuisance; (2) intentional interference with prospective economic advance; (3) negligent interference with prospective economic advantage; and (4) conversion.

As noted in Defendants' opposition, under California's Partition of Real Property Act, a complaint for partition by sale affords the defendants to that action certain rights. Specifically, in any action for partition filed on or after January 1, 2023, the Court "shall" determine the fair market value of the subject property under the process set forth in Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) § 874.316, and "shall" notify the parties that any non-partitioning cotenant may purchase the partitioning cotenants' interests in the subject property under CCP § 874.317. (See CCP § 874.311.) To wit: "If any cotenant requested partition by sale, the court shall, after the determination of value under Section 874.316, send notice to the parties that any cotenant except a cotenant that requested partition by sale may buy all the interests of the cotenants that requested partition by sale." (CCP § 874.317(a)) Upon receipt of said notice, the non-partitioning cotenants are provided 45 days to elect to purchase the partitioning cotenants' interests in the Property. (CCP § 874.317(b).)

Following the filing of the Complaint on May 8, 2024, the Court did not initiate the valuation process, but on July 15, 2024, Defendants did request valuation and indicate their desire to exercise first right of refusal of purchasing the property. There was no response by Plaintiffs until the instant Motion.

Defendants argue that while there is a liberal pleading standard, in this case, Defendants' rights will be materially prejudiced if Plaintiffs are allowed leave to amend the Complaint and remove the partition cause of action. *See Higgins v. Del Faro* (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564; *Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc.* (1996) Cal.App.4th 471, 487; and *Mac v. Minassian* (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 510, 519. Defendants assert that because Plaintiffs initiated their partition action after January 1, 2023, the statute requires the Court to determine the fair market value of the Property under CCP § 874.316 and to notify the parties of Defendants' right to purchase Plaintiffs' respective interests in the Property under § 874.317. While the Court did not initiate the valuation process, Defendants memorialized their intent to exercise that right by filing the Request and have begun the process of compiling their available funds to purchase Plaintiffs' interests. If the Motion is granted, Defendants argue they will be deprived of their statutory right to do so, which is an unequivocable prejudice. Defendants continue, if the Motion is denied, Plaintiffs will not be prejudiced because they are otherwise entitled to bring the tort claims set forth in the proposed First Amended Complaint against Defendants.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs voluntarily filed the Complaint to force a partition by sale and thereby availed themselves of the Partition of Real Property Act, whereas Defendants were involuntarily subjected to it, and it would therefore be unfair to now punish Defendants because Plaintiffs have apparent seller's remorse.

Defendants further argue that a plaintiff may not voluntarily dismiss an action after the "actual commencement of trial." (CCP § 581(b)(1) and (c).) "Case law broadly interprets the statutory term actual commencement to include circumstances in which a pretrial procedure has effectively disposed of a case or made an adverse judgment "inevitable." (See *Wilson v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC,* D070965 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2017), citing *Gogri v. Jack in the Box Inc.* (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 255, 261-262, 263.)

The Court agrees that it seems Plaintiffs brought the Complaint for partition by sale and upon learning the consequences of that cause of action, now seek to undo it, which does not seem to be a fair result to Defendants. While the Court is not necessarily opposed to an amendment of the Complaint, any such amendment to remove the cause of action for partition by sale seems prejudicial to Defendants.

TENTATIVE RULING #3:

MOTION DENIED.

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4.	**22CV0225**	**PEREZ v. AZEVEDO**
Motion to Amend		

Plaintiffs filed the original Complaint on February 2, 2022, and the First Amended Complaint on September 6, 2022. Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") on April 3, 2024, to add punitive damages. Plaintiffs now bring this Motion to file a Third Amended Complaint to name three additional defendants – Azevedo Custom Hay Company, Martha Ann Azevedo and Gregory Azevedo.

Any judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow amendment of any pleading or pretrial conference order. California Code of Civil Procedure ("CCP") §576. The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect. CCP §473(a)(1). Plaintiff argues that in light of additional newly discovered evidence from the depositions of Haley Silva (deposed November 14, 2023) and defendant Stratton Azevedo they should be allowed leave to amend.

Defendants oppose the Motion, arguing that 2 years and 8 months since the initial filing, Plaintiff again seek leave to amend in order to add three additional defendants and essentially a new cause of action for negligent entrustment. Additionally, while Plaintiffs counsel states that the Motion is the result of newly discovered evidence, Defendants argue that Martha Ann Azevedo and Gregory Azevedo were listed on the February 2021 Traffic Collision Report and discovery responses produced in January 2023 indicated Azevedo Custom Hay Company as the insurance policyholder.

Defendants point out that Plaintiff's Motion does not include the required notice of tentative ruling system, pursuant to Local Rules 7.10.05. Additionally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs must "[st]ate what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located and that Plaintiffs failed to do so. Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a)(3).

It is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend where Plaintiff did not make an evidentiary showing required by Rule 3.1324. (*Hatashi v. First American Home Buyers Protection Corp.* (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1454.) Courts have long held that it does not constitute an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend when the movant fails to include the details required by Rule 3.1324 in his or her declaration. (*Huff v. Wilkins* (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 732.)

While the Court understands the liberal pleading standard, in this situation, the Court is not satisfied that Plaintiffs have had the necessary information since at least January 2023 and failed to include the names of these new defendants in their Second Amended Pleading. While the depositions were not concluded until later in 2024, the Traffic Collision report and the

discovery responses provided the necessary information for Plaintiff to have added these additional defendants at an earlier time.

TENTATIVE RULING #4:

MOTION DENIED.

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5.	**24CV0932**	**TD BANK USA v. PILLON**
Motion to Deem Matters Admitted		

On June 28, 2024, Plaintiff served its first set of requests for admissions on defendant, and as of the date of the Motion, no response has been received. Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure ("CCP") §2033.280, Plaintiff brings this Motion to deem the truth of the matters admitted.

CCP §2033.280 provides that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, that party thereby waives any objection to the requests, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product under §2018.010 et seq. It further provides that the requesting party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests be deemed admitted. The court "shall" make this order unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admissions that is in substantial compliance with paragraph (1) of subdivision (f).

It is also mandatory that the court impose a monetary sanction on the party whose failure to serve a timely response to requests for admission necessitated the motion.

TENTATIVE RULING #5:

1. **MOTION GRANTED.**
2. **SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $150 ORDERED AGAINST DEFENDANT.**

NO HEARING ON THIS MATTER WILL BE HELD UNLESS A REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT IS TRANSMITTED ELECTRONICALLY THROUGH THE COURT'S WEBSITE OR BY TELEPHONE TO THE COURT AT (530) 621-6551 BY 4:00 P.M. ON THE DAY THE TENTATIVE RULING IS ISSUED. CAL. RULE CT. 3.1308; LOCAL RULE 8.05.07; SEE ALSO LEWIS V. SUPERIOR COURT, 19 CAL.4TH 1232, 1247 (1999).

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6.	23CV2042	WELLS FARGO BANK v. MURRAY HOLDINGS
Motions to Quash		

Third-party Golden 1 Credit Union ("Golden 1") brings this Motion to Quash, or in the alternative, for a Protective Order ("Motion"), under California Code of Civil Procedure ("CCP") §§ 1987.1 and 2025.420[1]. The Motion involves a deposition subpoena for the personal appearance and production of documents and things ("Subpoena") served by Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank National Association ("Wells Fargo").

From January 2024 until present, Golden 1 states that Wells Fargo has issued three successive, duplicative subpoenas to Golden 1 seeking documents, a deposition of the corporation covering an "expansive scope" of Golden 1's business, and a deposition from Golden 1's Chief Executive Officer. When Wells Fargo served its first subpoena for business records, Golden 1 states it timely produced responsive documents. Golden 1 heard nothing further from Wells Fargo, and the time for seeking further discovery pursuant to that subpoena expired.

Months later, Wells Fargo issued another subpoena to Golden 1 seeking the same document discovery as the first subpoena, a deposition of Golden 1's CEO, and a corporate deposition on topics that Golden 1 argues are "irrelevant, seek information available from the defendants, or are so hopelessly overbroad that a witness cannot reasonably prepare to cover their scope without undue burden." Golden 1 claims there are numerous deficiencies in the subpoenas, and that they reached out to Wells Fargo to work towards a compromise but that Wells Fargo has refused every effort to cooperate.

Golden 1 argues that Wells Fargo's duplicative subpoena should be quashed for at least five reasons: (1) Wells Fargo has allowed the deadline to move to compel further production on its first subpoena to lapse and cannot use a second subpoena to rectify its error; (2) Wells Fargo's second subpoena seeks irrelevant discovery; (3) it is unduly burdensome and costly for Golden 1 to search for responsive documents and to prepare the corporate representative witness(es); (4) Wells Fargo can procure much of the same discovery from less burdensome sources, including through the defendants; and (5) Golden 1 cannot produce some of the discovery sought pursuant to statutory and regulatory prohibitions on disclosure.[2]

Background

This case involves an alleged check-kiting scheme wherein Mr. Murray used an account with third-party Golden 1 to induce Wells Fargo to transfer funds to payees. In January 2024, Wells Fargo served a Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records on Golden 1 that

[1] The Court notes that the Notice of Motion does not comply with Local Rule 7.10.05.

[2] Golden 1 also points out that Wells Fargo has sought summary adjudication, taking the position that it needs no more evidence.

included 22 requests for documents ("First Subpoena") (Ex. B). Golden 1 notes the requests in the First Subpoena were sweeping and sought "all communications between Golden 1 and Murray," "all documents related to any bank accounts Murray had with Golden 1," and "all documents Golden 1 possesses that mention Murray." On January 9, 2024, Golden 1 responded with a production of responsive documents, which included a loan agreement between Murray and Golden 1, Murray's applications for membership and signature cards, and account statements from multiple Murray accounts for October and November 2023. The time for any motion to compel further responses on that production expired on March 11, 2024.

On May 28, 2024, two additional subpoenas were served on Golden 1 – one was a deposition subpoena for personal appearance of Golden 1's President and Chief Executive Officer, Donna Bland, ("Bland subpoena") and one was a deposition subpoena for personal appearance and production of documents and things to Golden 1 ("second Subpoena") (Ex. D). The second Subpoena includes an additional 16 requests for production of documents from Golden 1 – including "all documents related to Golden 1's policies, procedures, and practices related to" account offsets, overdrafts, uncollected funds, and check kiting, among others, "all documents related to any stop payment requests related to" Murray's accounts, and all documents related to any signature cards, including the signature cards themselves. The second Subpoena also seeks deposition testimony from Golden 1's corporate representative(s) on 15 different deposition topics, including topics such as "Golden 1's communications regarding the accounts Murray had with Golden 1," "Golden 1's policies, procedures, and practices related to" account offsets, overdrafts, uncollected funds, and check kiting, among others, and "all bank transfers made in 2023 to or from the accounts Murray had with Golden 1. There is an additional three to four pages of instructions and definitions.

Golden 1 argues it timely served objections to the Bland Subpoena and the second Subpoena on June 14, 2024. (Ex. E) The parties engaged in meet and confer efforts but were unsuccessful in reaching an agreement.

TENTATIVE RULING #6:

APPEARANCES REQUIRED ON FRIDAY, OCTOBER 18, 2024, AT 8:30 AM IN DEPARTMENT NINE.

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COUNTY LOCAL RULE 8.05.07. PROOF OF SERVICE OF SAID NOTICE MUST BE FILED PRIOR TO OR AT THE HEARING.

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7.	**23CV1751**	**WEBSTER v. WEBSTER**
Judgment on the Pleadings (2)		

Plaintiff Adrian D. Webster ("Plaintiff") brings these Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings ("Motion") against Megan Quinonez Webster ("Defendant Megan") and Timothy C. Webster ("Defendant Timothy") (collectively "Defendants").[1]

Plaintiff requests the court to take judicial notice of the Court's April 24, 2024, Notice of Entry of Order After Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion Deeming Admitted the Truth of Certain Facts, and Imposing Monetary Sanctions Against Defendant, along with the underlying Requests for Admission, as to each Defendant.

Judicial notice is a mechanism which allows the court to take into consideration matters which are presumed to be indisputably true. California Evidence Code Sections 451, 452, and 453 collectively govern the circumstances in which judicial notice of a matter may be taken. While Section 451 provides a comprehensive list of matters that must be judicially noticed, Section 452 sets forth matters which *may* be judicially noticed. A trial court is required to take judicial notice of any matter listed in section 452 if a party requests it and gives the other party sufficient notice to prepare to meet the request. Evidence Code § 453. Evidence Code § 452(d) permits judicial notice of "records of (1) any court in this state or (2) any court of record of the United States."

> ["It is true that a court may take judicial notice of a party's admissions or concessions, but only in cases where the admission "cannot reasonably be controverted," such as in answers to interrogatories or requests for admission, or in affidavits and declarations filed on the party's behalf. (*Pang v. Beverly Hospital, Inc.* (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 986, 989–990; see also *Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co.* (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604–605. ["The court will take judicial notice of records such as admissions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and the like, when considering a demurrer, only where they contain statements of the plaintiff or his agent which are inconsistent with the allegations of the pleading before the court."].)" (*Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.* (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 485.)]

Plaintiff's requests for judicial notice are granted.

Code of Civil Procedure §438(c)(1) The motion provided for in this section may only be made on one of the following grounds:

> (A) If the moving party is a plaintiff, that the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause or causes of action against the defendant and the answer does not state facts

[1] Both Motions are identical, aside from the fact that one is filed against Megan Quinonez Webster, and one is filed against Timothy C. Webster. The Court is only including the analysis once, since it is the exact same for both.

sufficient to constitute a defense to the complaint…." (Code of Civil Procedure, § 438(c)(1)(A).)

Plaintiff makes this Motion against Defendants as to the entire Complaint and all five causes of action. First, the Complaint was verified, and Defendants filed an unverified Answer. Code of Civil Procedure §446(a) provides, in pertinent part: "When the complaint is verified, the answer shall be verified."

The first cause of action is for Financial Elder Abuse and Plaintiff pled all the essential elements – he was over 65 years old, he suffered from limitations that limited his ability to carry out normal activities or to adequately protect his rights, Defendants were in a position of trust, and Defendants knew he was an elder. (Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions (2024 ed.) CACI No. 3100) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants' conduct meets the definition of financial abuse as defined in Welfare & Institutions Code §§ 15610.30(a) and 15610.30(b), that Defendants intentionally concealed facts from Plaintiff with the intent to defraud him and in so doing engaged in coercion and undue influence within the meaning of Welfare & Institutions Code §15610.70, and that Defendants' actions resulted in financial harm and mental suffering, with their treatment equating to financial elder abuse under Welfare & Institutions Code §15610.07(a).

Plaintiff alleges general and economic damages, including mental distress, as a result of Defendants' conduct, and that he has incurred and will continue to incur attorney's fees and costs, and that these are recoverable from Defendants pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code §15657.5(a). In their unverified Answers, Defendants do not deny any of the factual allegations of the first cause of action, do not assert any facts of their own, and they have one, conclusory affirmative defense of "consent" which is not supported. Plaintiff has pleaded all facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendants for financial elder abuse and Defendants have not pled facts sufficient to constitute a defense.

The second cause of action is for conversion. Plaintiff alleges that the $400,000+ Defendants took from Plaintiff belonged solely to Plaintiff, Plaintiff was the only person with the right to those funds, Defendants intentionally and substantially interfered with Plaintiff's monies without his consent and without his knowledge, taking those funds and using them for her own benefit and not Plaintiff's, Plaintiff did not consent to Defendants taking monies from his accounts, and Defendants have not returned any funds to Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges the amount of money is a specific sum that can be determined with particularity - $402,201. (Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions (2024 ed.) CACI No. 2100) In their unverified Answers, Defendants do not deny any of the factual allegations of the second cause of action, do not assert any facts of their own, and they have one, conclusory affirmative defense of "consent" which is not supported. Plaintiff has pleaded all facts necessary to constitute a cause of action

against Defendants for conversion and Defendants have not pled facts sufficient to constitute a defense.

The third cause of action is for fraudulent concealment. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants took advantage of Plaintiff's trust, induced Plaintiff to give Defendant Timothy access to Plaintiff's accounts, and that Defendants took at least $402,201 for themselves. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Megan intentionally misrepresented that she would take care of Plaintiff, with the intention to induce Plaintiff to give Defendants access to Plaintiff's money, and that Defendants actively concealed their motives from Plaintiff, preventing Plaintiff from discovering them. Plaintiff would not have given Defendants access to his funds if he knew Defendants' true motives. Plaintiff alleges that he has been harmed by Defendants' fraudulent concealment. (Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions (2024 ed.) CACI No. 1901) In their unverified Answers, Defendants do not deny any of the factual allegations of the third cause of action, do not assert any facts of their own, and they have one, conclusory affirmative defense of "consent" which is not supported. Plaintiff has pleaded all facts necessary to constitute a cause of action against Defendants for fraudulent concealment and Defendants have not pled facts sufficient to constitute a defense.

The fourth case of action is for constructive fraud. Plaintiff alleges that there was a fiduciary and confidential relationship between himself and Defendants, upon which Plaintiff justifiably relied to his detriment. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants owed him the duty of utmost good faith and fairness in all matters pertaining to Plaintiff's real and personal property. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants accepted Plaintiff's reliance on that relationship, and that Defendants breached that fiduciary duty and confidential relationship to gain an advantage over the management and control of Plaintiff's assets. (Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions (2024 ed.) CACI No. 4111) In their unverified Answers, Defendants do not deny any of the factual allegations of the fourth cause of action, do not assert any facts of her own, and they have one, conclusory affirmative defense of "consent" which is not supported. Plaintiff has pleaded all facts necessary to constitute a cause of action against Defendants for constructive fraud and Defendants have not pled facts sufficient to constitute a defense.

The fifth cause of action is for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' conduct as set forth in paragraphs 1-45 of the Complaint was outrageous and intended to cause Plaintiff emotional distress. Plaintiff alleges that he did suffer severe emotional distress and that Defendants' conduct was a substantial factor in that. (Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions (2024 ed.) CACI No. 1600. Plaintiff has pleaded all facts necessary to constitute a cause of action against Defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress and Defendants have not pled facts sufficient to constitute a defense.

On April 24, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to deem admitted requests for admission propounded upon Defendants. The facts in the Complaint are deemed admitted by Defendants and therefore, cannot reasonably be controverted.

Both Motions were unopposed.

TENTATIVE RULING #7:

1. **MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AGAINST DEFENDANT MEGAN QUINONEZ WEBSTER IS GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.**
2. **MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AGAINST DEFENDANT TIMOTHY C. WEBSTER IS GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.**

NO HEARING ON THIS MATTER WILL BE HELD UNLESS A REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT IS TRANSMITTED ELECTRONICALLY THROUGH THE COURT'S WEBSITE OR BY TELEPHONE TO THE COURT AT (530) 621-6551 BY 4:00 P.M. ON THE DAY THE TENTATIVE RULING IS ISSUED. CAL. RULE CT. 3.1308; LOCAL RULE 8.05.07; SEE ALSO LEWIS V. SUPERIOR COURT, 19 CAL.4TH 1232, 1247 (1999).

NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES OF A REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND THE GROUNDS UPON WHICH ARGUMENT IS BEING REQUESTED MUST BE MADE BY TELEPHONE OR IN PERSON BY 4:00 P.M. ON THE DAY THE TENTATIVE RULING IS ISSUED. CAL. RULE CT. 3.1308; EL DORADO COUNTY LOCAL RULE 8.05.07. PROOF OF SERVICE OF SAID NOTICE MUST BE FILED PRIOR TO OR AT THE HEARING.

LONG CAUSE HEARINGS MUST BE REQUESTED BY 4:00 P.M. ON THE DAY THE TENTATIVE RULING IS ISSUED AND THE PARTIES ARE TO PROVIDE THE COURT WITH THREE MUTUALLY AGREEABLE DATES ON FRIDAY AFTERNOONS AT 2:30 P.M. LONG CAUSE ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTS WILL BE SET FOR HEARING ON ONE OF THE THREE MUTUALLY AGREEABLE DATES ON FRIDAY AFTERNOONS AT 2:30 P.M. THE COURT WILL ADVISE THE PARTIES OF THE LONG CAUSE HEARING DATE AND TIME BY 5:00 P.M. ON THE DAY THE TENTATIVE RULING IS ISSUED. PARTIES MAY PERSONALLY APPEAR AT THE HEARING.

IF A PARTY OR PARTIES WISH TO APPEAR BY ZOOM, PLEASE CONTACT THE COURT AT (530) 621-5867 AND MEETING INFORMATION WILL BE PROVIDED.